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STUDENT IS A NICE NAME FOR FREE LABOR 
Jenna M. Anderson* 
 
 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) contends that 
the principle of amateurism protects student-athletes and ensures that 
their number one priority is education.  Although this may have been 
true when the NCAA was formed, the commercialization of college 
sports and accompanying monetary incentives have enticed the NCAA 
to enforce rules that exploit student-athletes at the detriment of their 
education. 
The NCAA’s impure motives are no longer going unnoticed.  The 
public is disgusted by what it sees in the media.  Student-athletes are 
rebelling by suing the NCAA for violating federal antitrust laws.  The 
states are passing laws that give the NCAA no choice but to make a 
change.  Courts are chipping away at the principle of amateurism one 
case at a time. 
The NCAA must be held accountable.  This note proposes a three-
part, student-centered solution to reform the current state of affairs.  
First, the United States Supreme Court should definitively hold that the 
principle of amateurism is not a legitimate procompetitive purpose for 
the NCAA to pursue.  Second, the NCAA should abolish the principle of 
amateurism and create a line of demarcation between college and 
professional athletics by redefining the term “student-athlete” to place 
an appropriate emphasis on education.  Third, the universities should 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) claims that 
the number one priority of a Division I student-athlete is education, 
while the competitive sport is an extracurricular activity.1  The NCAA 
contends that its rules protect student-athletes from dangerous athletic 
practices and exploitation.2  Although these claims may have been true 
when the NCAA was formed, the commercialization of college sports 
and accompanying monetary incentives have enticed the NCAA to 
enforce rules that exploit student-athletes at the detriment of their 
education.3 
Student-athletes provide free labor to the NCAA and member 
universities, while the NCAA rakes in millions of dollars in revenue.4  
The NCAA has strict rules prohibiting student-athletes from seeking 
representation, receiving compensation, entering a professional draft, 
benefiting from their own name, image, or likeness, etc.5  Student-
athletes who disagree with the anticompetitive effects of these rules have 
filed numerous lawsuits against the NCAA.6  The NCAA has continued 
to fight back by arguing that the principle of amateurism justifies the 
anticompetitive rules.7 
The NCAA has successfully exploited student-athletes under the 
guise of amateurism for years, but as of late, “[t]hreats [against the 
NCAA] loom on multiple fronts: in Congress, the courts, breakaway 
athletic conferences, student rebellion, and public disgust.”8  In response 
to these threats, the NCAA will likely modernize the name, image, and 
likeness rules.9  However, the NCAA has made it clear that it will not 
abandon the principle of amateurism.10 
 
 1. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2020-2021 DIVISION I MANUAL §§ 2.9, 
2.15 (2020) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-
sports/308643/. 
 4. See id. 
 5. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.1.2. 
 6. See Branch, supra note 3. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Council grants waiver to allow transfer student-
athletes to compete immediately, NCAA (Dec. 16, 2020, 6:31 PM), 
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/di-council-grants-waiver-allow-
transfer-student-athletes-compete-immediately. 
 10. See Donald M. Remy, NCAA statement regarding Supreme Court petition for Alston 
case, NCAA (Oct. 15, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/news/ncaa-statement-regarding-supreme-court-petition-alston-case. 
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Part II of this Note provides the necessary background information, 
including discussing the evolution of the NCAA and its path to becoming 
the economic powerhouse it is today.11  The section then discusses the 
NCAA’s expansion of the term “student-athlete,” and how it avoided 
classifying student-athletes as employees.12  Next, the section explains 
the rule, rationale, and reality behind the principle of amateurism.13  The 
section then discusses the Sherman Antitrust Act and how it is relevant 
to NCAA litigation and provides a deeper analysis of amateurism.14  
Finally, the section outlines the major points of the name, image, and 
likeness debate15 and Fair Pay to Play legislation.16 
Part III of this Note identifies the legal problem associated with the 
vague and inconsistent principle of amateurism.17  Part IV conducts an 
analysis of the legal problem and explains why the principle of 
amateurism should not be upheld.18  The analysis section explains why 
the principle of amateurism is no longer consistent with reality.19  The 
section then refutes the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications for 
amateurism by detailing why amateurism does not keep college sports 
pure,20 why amateurism is not essential for college sports to remain 
popular,21 and why amateurism is more detrimental to education than 
helpful.22  Next, the section analyzes the difficulties associated with 
making student-athletes employees.23  The section then explains why 
allowing student-athletes to accept compensation from third-parties for 
the use of name, image, and likeness is a step in the right direction.24  
Lastly, the analysis section illustrates the concept of allowing 
professional athletes to compete at the intercollegiate level.25 
The final portion of this Note, Part V, proposes a three-part, 
student-centered solution to reform the current state of affairs.26  First, 
this section urges the United States Supreme Court to definitively hold 
that the principle of amateurism is not a legitimate procompetitive 
 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
 14. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 15. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 16. See infra Part II.D. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Part IV.A. 
 20. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 21. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 22. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 23. See infra Part IV.B. 
 24. See infra Part IV.C. 
 25. See infra Part IV.D. 
 26. See infra Part V. 
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purpose for the NCAA to pursue.27  Second, this section encourages the 
NCAA to abolish the principle of amateurism and create a line of 
demarcation between college and professional athletics by redefining the 
term “student-athlete” to place an appropriate emphasis on education.28  
Third, this section proposes improvements to the current curriculum 
options offered to student-athletes.29 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Evolution of the NCAA 
The NCAA is an association that functions as a governing body for 
varsity-level competition in intercollegiate sports for men and women.30  
The association was founded in 1906 to protect student-athletes from 
dangerous athletic practices and exploitation.31 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the brutality of college football 
caused numerous fatalities.32  “A reported 18 boys were killed and 149 
seriously hurt during the 1905 football season.”33  Public outrage and 
talk of ending the sport for good prompted the creation of the 
NCAA.34  While the NCAA tried to enforce rules, it remained 
powerless for many years.35 
It was not until 1951, when the NCAA hired Walter Byers to act 
as the first full-time executive director, that the NCAA was able to 
assert any force.36  Byers created a small infractions board to set 
penalties against schools who did not comply with NCAA rules.37  
To put the NCAA back on the map, he used a scandal involving the 
University of Kentucky,38 a reigning national basketball champion.39  
 
 27. See infra Part V.A. 
 28. See infra Part V.B. 
 29. See infra Part V.C. 
 30. National Collegiate Athletic Association, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Collegiate-Athletic-Association (last visited Jan. 
25, 2021); see also What is the NCAA?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Dec. 18, 2020) (noting that NCAA members include 
1,098 colleges and universities and 102 athletic conferences). 
 31. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 30; see WALTER BYERS & CHARLES 
HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 7, 38-39 (1995). 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Branch, supra note 3. 
 35. Id. (explaining how the NCAA could not even successfully mandate helmets 
until 1939). 
 36. See BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 17, 56; see also Branch, supra note 3. 
 37. See Branch, supra note 3. 
 38. See BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 17 (noting a scandal involving illegal 
payments and point manipulation). 
 39. See Branch, supra note 3. 
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By lobbying and gaining the support of a Dean at the University of 
Kentucky, Byers successfully suspended the Kentucky basketball 
team for the entire 1952-53 season.40  As a result, schools began to 
take the NCAA more seriously and comply with its rules.41 
In the same year, the NCAA voted to outlaw televised games, 
but to retain the right to license a specific few through the 
association, including licensing certain football games to NBC for 
$1.14 million.42  The NBC contract marked the start of rapid growth 
in revenue and power for the NCAA.43  Byers went on to negotiate 
nearly fifty sports television contracts, securing a several multi-
million dollar deals for the NCAA.44 
By 1973, the NCAA was large enough to reorganize and create 
three levels of competition: Division I (most competitive), Division II, 
and Division III (least competitive).45  Despite the three levels of 
competition, most of the NCAA’s time and resources are spent on 
Division I athletics.46 
The NCAA of today generates the majority of its revenue from 
“[t]elevision and marketing rights fees, primarily from the Division I 
men’s basketball championship.  Championship ticket sales provide 
most of the remaining dollars.”47  The NCAA generates $867.5 million 
in revenue from the Division I Men’s Basketball Championship and 
$177.9 million in revenue from ticket sales for championships.48  The 
NCAA distributes these funds in the following ways: $222 million is 
“[d]istributed to Division I schools to help fund NCAA sports and 
provide scholarships for college athletes[;]” $168.8 million is 
“[d]istributed to Division I conferences and independent schools[,] 
based on their performance in the men’s basketball tournament over a 
six-year rolling period[,]” “to fund NCAA sports and provide 
scholarships for college athletes[;]” $153.8 million “[p]rovides college 
athletes the opportunity to compete for a championship and includes 
support for team travel, food, and lodging[;]” $86.6 million is 
“[d]istributed to Division I student-athletes for essential needs that arise 
 
 40. Id.; see also BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 17. 
 41. See Branch, supra note 3. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 9. 
 45. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 30. 
 46. See Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/where-does-
money-go (last visited Dec. 22, 2020). 
 47. See Finances, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2020). 
 48. See Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/where-does-
money-go (last visited Dec. 22, 2020). 
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during their time in college[;]” $64.5 million funds “catastrophic injury 
insurance, drug testing, student-athlete leadership programs, post 
graduate scholarships and additional Association-wide championships 
support[;]” $53.6 million is “[d]istributed equally among Division I 
basketball-playing conferences[,] that meet athletic and academic 
standards to play in the men’s basketball tournament,” “to fund NCAA 
sports and provide scholarships for college athletes[;]” $49.2 million is 
“[d]istributed to Division I schools to assist with academic programs and 
services[;]” $53.3 million “[f]unds championships, grants and other 
initiatives for Division II college athletes[;]” $23.3 million “[c]overs 
costs related to NCAA governance committees and the annual NCAA 
Convention[;]” $35.2 million “[f]unds championships, grants and other 
initiatives for Division III college athletes[;]” $10 million is 
“[d]istributed to Division I conferences for programs that enhance 
officiating, compliance, minority opportunities and more[;]” $3.8 
million “[s]upports various educational services for members to help 
prepare student-athletes for life, including the Emerging Leaders 
Seminars and the Pathway Program[;]” $58.4 million “[i]ncludes 
support for Association-wide legal services, communications and 
business insurance[;]” and $ 44.8 million “[f]unds the day-to-day 
operations of the NCAA national office, including administrative and 
financial services, information technology and facilities management.”49 
In addition to growth of the NCAA’s revenue, its body of rules has 
increased in complexity.50  According to Byers, the NCAA evolved from 
“simple rules and personally responsible officials to convoluted, 
cyclopedic regulations;”51 now, student-athletes are expected to comply 
with a 450-page manual.52 
B. The NCAA’s Carefully Crafted “Student-Athlete” 
Walter Byers is known as “the man who built the NCAA, then tried 
to tear it down.”53  In his book, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting 
College Athletes, Byers apologized for the mess he created.54  He 
admitted that the NCAA purposely “crafted the term student-athlete” to 
 
 49. Id. (“The distributions listed are recurring, and the information does not include any 
one-time distributions.”). 
 50. See BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 17. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1. 
 53. Karen Given, Walter Byers: The Man Who Built The NCAA, Then Tried to Tear it 
Down, WBUR (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/onlyagame/2017/10/13/walter-byers-
ncaa. 
 54. Id.; see generally BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31. 
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be ambiguous to avoid paying students workers’ compensation.55  
Despite its ambiguity, the term student-athlete was cited by the courts in 
favor of the NCAA during workers’ compensation cases.56  For example, 
in the 1950s, Ray Dennison’s widow filed for workers’ compensation 
death benefits after her husband died from a head injury received while 
playing football for his college team.57  The NCAA avoided liability in 
this case because Dennison was classified as a “student-athlete” and the 
university was not “in the football business.”58  After this case, 
“[s]tudent-athlete became the NCAA’s signature term, repeated 
constantly in and out of courtrooms.”59 
A similar lawsuit was filed in the 1990s by Kent Waldrep, a 
running back at Texas Christian University (TCU), who became 
paralyzed after being tackled in a game.60  TCU stopped paying his 
medical bills after nine months, leaving his family to rely on charity 
money.61  The appeals court rejected Waldrep’s workers’ 
compensation claim because he could not be classified as an 
employee.62  Their justification relied on the fact that he had not paid 
taxes on the financial aid he received.63  The NCAA successfully 
crafted and implemented the term “student-athlete” and they 
justified it with the “principle of amateurism.”64 
C. The Principle of Amateurism 
At the core of the NCAA is the “principle of amateurism,” the idea 
that a professional athlete is prohibited from competing at the 
intercollegiate level.65  The NCAA defines a professional athlete as “one 
who receives any kind of payment, directly or indirectly, for athletics 
participation except as permitted by the governing legislation of the 
Association.”66  The definition of compensation has evolved over time 
to allow students to be awarded “full cost of tuition” scholarships while 
 
 55. BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 69 (explaining that university’s workers’ 
compensation plans provide no coverage for disabling injuries student-athletes may suffer). 
 56. See Branch, supra note 3; see also BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 70. 
 57. See Branch, supra note 3; see also BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 70. 
 58. See Branch, supra note 3. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Branch, supra note 3. 
 64. See BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 68-69. 
 65. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 12.01.1, 12.01.2. 
 66. Id. § 12.02.11. 
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still being considered an amateur.67  Under the “principle of 
amateurism,” the NCAA Constitution states that: 
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and 
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and 
by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.  Student 
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-
athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and 
commercial enterprises.68 
The amateur status can be lost when the individual gets paid or accepts 
a promise of pay based on athletic skill, makes any commitment to play 
professional athletics, enters into a professional draft, or enters into an 
agreement with an agent.69  If an individual loses the “amateur status,” 
he or she becomes ineligible to compete in that particular intercollegiate 
sport.70 
The NCAA is so adamant that student-athletes remain amateurs that 
the word “amateur” appears 191 times in the 2020-21 Manual.71  The 
NCAA has articulated several justifications for upholding amateurism: 
(1) amateurism keeps college sports “pure;”72 (2) amateurism is essential 
for college sports to remain successful and popular;73 and (3) amateurism 
allows student-athletes to receive an education.74 
 
 67. Marc Tracy, Top Conferences to Allow Aid for Athletes’ Full Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/sports/ncaas-top-conferences-to-allow-aid-
for-athletes-full-bills.html (reporting that in January 2015, the NCAA agreed to permit 
increased scholarships up to the full cost of attendance). 
 68. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §2.9. 
 69. See id. § 12.1.2 (“An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for 
intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) Uses his or her athletics 
skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport; (b) Accepts a promise of pay 
even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate athletics 
participation; (c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics, 
regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received, except as permitted in 
Bylaw 12.2.5.1; (d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or 
any other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based on 
athletics skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations; (e) 
Competes on any professional athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.12, even if no pay or 
remuneration for expenses was received, except as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.3.2.1; (f) After 
initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional draft (see Bylaw 12.2.4); or 
(g) Enters into an agreement with an agent.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1. 
 72. See Branch, supra note 3. 
 73. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984); see also 
Thomas Baker, Why The Latest NCAA Lawsuit Is Unlikely To Change Its Amateurism Rules—
But Should, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2018, 12:40 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbaker/2018/09/11/the-economics-of-amateurism-
breaking-down-the-latest-lawsuit-against-the-ncaa/?sh=b13acd824788. 
 74. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 124 (White, J., dissenting). 
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1. Amateurism in Practice 
While justifications for amateurism sound reasonable, in practice 
they have led to absurd results.  For example, A.J. Green, a Division I 
wide receiver, was penalized with a four-game suspension because he 
sold an old jersey to raise money for a spring-break trip.75  According to 
the NCAA, the profit generated by the sale violated Green’s amateur 
status.76  “While he served the suspension, the Georgia Bulldogs store 
continued legally selling replicas of Green’s No. eight jersey for 
$39.95 and up.”77  Similarly, the NCAA imposed a five-game 
suspension on Terrelle Pryor, Ohio State quarterback, for getting a 
tattoo that was discounted as a result of his football popularity.78  
Critics of the NCAA’s strict policy argue that the fact that the sale 
of a jersey received a four-game suspension and getting a discount 
deserved a five-game suspension is evidence of the arbitrary nature 
of these penalties.79 
James Paxton, a pitcher for the University of Kentucky, rejected 
a $1 million contract from the Toronto Blue Jays because he wanted 
to pitch for his team in the College World Series.80  However, 
because Paxton used an agent to negotiate with the Blue Jays, he was 
in violation of the NCAA bylaws.81  Paxton was suspended from the 
team because the University did not want to be reprimanded by the 
NCAA and jeopardize its chance to compete.82  Paxton lost the 
opportunity to play for both the Blue Jays and his University.83 
2. The Sherman Antitrust Act and NCAA Litigation 
Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (hereinafter “Sherman 
Act”) prohibits unreasonable restraints on trade.84  In order to establish 
a Section 1 violation, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that there was a 
contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that the agreement 
unreasonably restrained trade under either a per se rule of illegality or a 
 
 75. Branch, supra note 3. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Branch, supra note 3. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C § 1 (2004) (“Every contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is  declared to be illegal.”); see Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. 
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (recognizing the Sherman Act as only 
prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade). 
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rule of reason analysis; and (3) that the restraint affected interstate 
commerce.”85  The NCAA has been forced to defend its compensation 
and eligibility rules against antitrust challenges on numerous 
occasions.86  Presently, only one Sherman Act violation claim filed 
against the NCAA has been heard by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.87 
In 1981, the NCAA’s television plan limited the number of games 
a university could televise as well as the amount available to the public.88  
Frustrated by the NCAA’s tight hold on this major revenue stream, 
several universities decided to disregard the contract plan and negotiate 
with a television network on their own.89  The NCAA threatened to 
impose sanctions on the universities as punishment for entering into an 
independent contract.90  Two universities, the University of Oklahoma 
and the University of Georgia, filed suit, alleging that the NCAA’s 
control over the television rights was anticompetitive and an 
unreasonable restraint on trade.91 
The district court sided with the universities and “defined the 
relevant market as ‘live college football television.’ ” 92  The district 
court compared the NCAA’s control to a “classic cartel.”93  The court of 
appeals affirmed, finding that the NCAA’s plan constituted illegal per se 
price fixing.94  The court of appeals rejected all three of the NCAA’s 
arguments: the television plan promoted live attendance, athletically 
 
 85. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hairston v. 
Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 86. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic 
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 2020 WL 
6150345 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2020) (No. 20-512). 
 87. Jessica Gresko, High court agrees to hear NCAA athlete compensation case, AP 
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/athlete-compensation-basketball-elena-
kagan-football-us-supreme-court-4fa2fc30e1a3f21329f4ec22cc55bb28. However, this will 
no longer be the case after the Supreme Court hears Alston in the Spring of 2021. Petition for 
a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 86; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 85 (1984). 
 88. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 91-94. 
 89. Id. at 94-95. 
 90. Id. at 95. 
 91. Id. at 88. 
 92. Id. at 95. 
 93. Id. at 96 (making this comparison because the NCAA had “almost absolute control 
over the supply of college football which is made available to the networks, to television 
advertisers, and ultimately to the viewing public.”). Author Taylor Branch, also referred to 
the NCAA’s control as a “classic cartel.” See Branch, supra note 3. Branch explains that it 
was the influence of Walter Byers that made the NCAA the classic cartel it is today. Id. 
(“Byers, having negotiated the NCAA’s television package up to $3.1 million per football 
season—which was higher than the NFL’s figure in those early years—had made the NCAA 
into a spectacularly profitable cartel.”). 
 94. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 97. 
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balanced competition, and effective competition with other television 
programming.95 
The Supreme Court heard the case and made note that the issues in 
the case,96 horizontal price fixing and output limitation, are usually 
viewed by the Court under a per se rule of illegality,97 where an inquiry 
into a particular market is not necessary.98  However, the Court found 
that it would be “inappropriate to apply a per se rule in this case [as] it 
involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are 
essential if the product is to be available at all.”99  Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court used the rule of reason standard to evaluate whether or 
not the restraint was unreasonable.100  Under this standard, the Court is 
required to consider the impact of the competitive conditions.101  The 
rule of reason analysis consists of three steps.102  In step one, the 
plaintiffs produce evidence of “significant anticompetitive effects within 
a relevant market.”103  If the plaintiffs meet the burden set forth in step 
one, step two requires the defendants to provide “evidence of the 
restraint’s procompetitive effects.”104  In step three, the plaintiffs must 
show that substantially less restrictive alternatives exist to achieve 
legitimate objectives.105 
In Board of Regents, the NCAA was unable to convince the 
Supreme Court that maintaining a competitive balance was a 
procompetitive justification because in this situation, consumption 
would increase if controls were removed.106  The NCAA was also unable 
to convince the Court that the broadcasting restraint was essential for the 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) 
(explaining that the per se rule is applied when “the practice facially appears to be one that 
would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”). 
 98. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100 (noting that when a per se rule is appropriate, restraint 
is presumed to be unreasonable without considering market context). 
 99. Id. at 86. (“The NCAA and its members market competition itself—contests between 
competing institutions,” thus a rule of reason standard should be applied). 
 100. Id.; see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating the 
rule of reason three-step framework: (1) plaintiff must produce evidence of “significant 
anticompetitive effects within a relevant market” (2) if plaintiff meets burden, defendant 
provides evidence of “restraint’s procompetitive effects” (3) plaintiff must show substantially 
less restrictive alternatives exist to achieve legitimate objectives). 
 101. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103 (explaining that reasonableness can be determined 
on nature or character of contract or on surrounding circumstances). 
 102. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119-20. 
 
2021] STUDENT IS A NICE NAME FOR FREE LABOR 601 
preservation of amateurism by spreading revenues among the schools.107  
In dicta, the Supreme Court recognized the value of amateurism, but did 
not find this role consistent with rules that restrict output.108  Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the lower courts, holding 
that the NCAA “restricted rather than enhanced the place of 
intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.”109 
Student-athletes saw this holding as an opportunity to use the 
Sherman Act to put an end to amateurism.  However, lower courts have 
continued to uphold the principle of amateurism by citing one line of 
dicta from Board of Regents, “[i]n order to preserve the character and 
quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be required to 
attend class, and the like.”110  In a string of federal appeals in 1988, 1992, 
and 2012, the NCAA successfully defended amateurism from the 
Sherman Act. 
In 1988, a class action lawsuit was filed against the NCAA, 
McCormack v. NCAA,111 alleging the NCAA violated antitrust and civil 
rights laws by restricting benefits awarded to student-athletes.112  The 
NCAA distinguished this case from Board of Regents by arguing that, 
unlike the television restrictions, the eligibility rules have primarily 
noncommercial objectives, as they are intended to promote 
amateurism.113  The Fifth Circuit applied the rule of reason and 
determined that the NCAA’s eligibility requirements rationally furthered 
the goal of amateurism and did not pose an unreasonable restraint on 
trade.114 
In 1992, a Notre Dame football player sued the NCAA in Banks v. 
NCAA,115 on the grounds that the no draft and no agent rules constituted 
an illegal restraint on trade in violation of the Sherman Act.116  Banks 
suffered from recurring football related injuries throughout his college 
 
 107. Id. at 87. 
 108. Id. at 120 (“The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition 
of amateurism in college sports. There can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to 
play that role, or that the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness 
and diversity to intercollegiate athletics.”). 
 109. Id. This decision “freed the football schools to sell any and all games the markets 
would bear. Coaches and administrators no longer had to share the revenue generated by their 
athletes with smaller schools outside the football consortium.” Branch, supra note 3. Even 
though this was a major loss of revenue for the NCAA, “a rising tide of money from basketball 
concealed the structural damage of the Regents decision.” Id. 
 110. Id. at 102. 
 111. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 112. Id. at 1340. 
 113. Id. at 1343. 
 114. Id. at 1343-45. 
 115. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 116. Id. at 1084. 
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career.117  In an effort to fully recover, he decided to sit out for the 
football season of his fourth year.118  During that time, he entered the 
National Football League (NFL) draft and contracted an agent to 
represent him.119  He was not drafted but was informed “that he would 
have been invited to the regular NFL scouting try-outs if he had 
completed his collegiate eligibility.”120  He then decided to exercise his 
final year of eligibility,121 but was barred by the NCAA for breaching 
the no draft122 and no agent123 bylaws.124  The Seventh Circuit applied 
the rule of reason standard and ruled in favor of the NCAA, holding that 
Banks failed “to allege an anti-competitive impact on a discernible 
market.”125 
Circuit Judge Flaum dissented, acknowledging that the nationwide 
labor market for college football players does exist.126  He explained that 
NCAA member colleges do in fact purchase the labor of players; “[t]he 
players agree to compete in football games sponsored by the colleges, 
games that typically garner the colleges a profit, in exchange for tuition, 
room, board and other benefits.”127  He further reasoned that the no draft 
rule is anticompetitive because a university offering students the ability 
to return to intercollegiate athletics if the draft proves unsuccessful 
would be more attractive to an elite student-athlete than a university 
declining to offer that opportunity.128  Judge Flaum recognized that the 
principles of amateurism are not consistent with reality; while college 
football generates nonpecuniary benefits, it is also highly 
commercialized and profitable.129 
 
 117. Id. at 1083. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1083 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that NCAA rules only 
allow an athlete to play four seasons of an intercollegiate sport within five years of entering 
college). 
 122. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.2.4.2 (“After initial full-time collegiate 
enrollment, an individual loses amateur status in a particular sport when the individual asks 
to be placed on the draft list . . . of a professional league in that sport.”). 
 123. Id. § 12.3.1 (“An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate 
sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the 
purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport.”). 
 124. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 125. Id. at 1094. 
 126. Id. at 1095 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1099 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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In 2012, Agnew v. NCAA130 involved the NCAA’s scholarship 
restrictions.131  Two former college football players, Agnew and 
Courtney, had been highly recruited high school football players who 
received offers from a number of college football teams.132  Agnew, in 
2006, and Courtney, in 2009, accepted one-year full athletic scholarships 
to play football for their respective universities.133  At the time, the 
NCAA bylaws prohibited member universities from offering student-
athletes multi-year scholarships.134  Both Agnew and Courtney suffered 
injuries that resulted in the loss of their scholarships.135  They filed a 
lawsuit against the NCAA, alleging that the NCAA’s one-year 
maximum scholarship requirement as well as the cap on scholarships 
available violated the Sherman Act.136  The plaintiffs argued that the 
relevant trade market being restrained was “the labor market for student-
athletes and the product market for bachelor’s degrees.”137 
The dissenting judge in Banks,138 Seventh Circuit Judge Flaum, 
presided over Agnew as well, but this time he wrote for the majority 
siding with the NCAA.139  The district court did not consider whether 
the NCAA bylaws were unreasonably restricting trade because they 
dismissed the case on grounds that the plaintiffs could not “allege a 
relevant cognizable market under the Sherman Act.”140  Judge Flaum and 
the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that these plaintiffs did 
not allege a relevant cognizable market; however, they did not agree that 
the plaintiffs could not allege such a market.141  The Court recognized 
that “[i]t is undeniable that a market of some sort is at play in this 
case,”142 but the Sherman Act only applies to commercial transactions.143  
 
 130. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 131. Id. at 332. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 333 (noting that plaintiffs challenged two NCAA Bylaws from the 2009-10 
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL––the one-year scholarship limit in bylaw 15.3.3.1 and the cap on 
the amount of athletic scholarships colleges are allowed to offer in bylaw 15.5.4). 
 135. Id. at 332 (stating that Courtney’s financial circumstances and loss of scholarship 
forced him to transfer schools and pay tuition out-of-pocket). 
 136. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 137. Id. at 334 (stating plaintiffs’ argument that if allowed, schools would offer multi-year 
scholarships to remain competitive in the market for premier student-athletes). 
 138. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1094 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 139. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 332. 
 140. Id. at 345 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 338. 
 143. See id. at 340 (“Despite the nonprofit status of NCAA member schools, the 
transactions those schools make with premier athletes—full scholarships in exchange for 
athletic services—are not noncommercial, since schools can make millions of dollars as a 
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This opinion invited future plaintiffs to be creative and identify the 
proper market. 
In a string of cases in 2006, 2009, and 2013, the NCAA took a step 
back in terms of protecting the principle of amateurism.  In 2006, a class 
action lawsuit, White v. NCAA,144 was filed against the NCAA by 
Division I football and basketball student-athletes.145  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the NCAA’s grant-in-aid (GIA) cap requirement, 
prohibiting member institutions from covering expenses other than 
tuition, room and board, and books,146 violated the Sherman Act because 
if given the opportunity, member institutions would compete to offer 
better financial aid packages to desirable prospective athletes.147  The 
NCAA settled the case for $10 million and dedicated $218 million to 
student-athletes in financial or academic need.148  Although the 
settlement did not require the NCAA to admit any fault or wrong 
doing,149 it was a foothold for future litigation. 
In 2009, Oliver v. NCAA150 involved a challenge to the NCAA’s 
bylaws prohibiting student-athletes from hiring attorneys or agents to be 
present at negotiations with professional organizations.151  Oliver, a 
baseball player for Oklahoma State University, was suspended 
indefinitely after the NCAA found out he had hired a sports agent and 
entered the Major League Baseball (MLB) draft prior to entering 
college.152  The Minnesota Twins offered him a contract while his agent 
was present, but he ultimately decided he would rather go to college.153  
In response to the suspension, Oliver sought a declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief enjoining the NCAA bylaws prohibiting representation 
by a lawyer or agent as unenforceable.154 
The district court found the rule contravened the NCAA’s goal of 
protecting student-athletes because it “allows for exploitation of the 
 
result of these transactions.”). The Court is suggesting that the transaction is commercial and 
the Sherman Act could apply if litigated properly. Id. 
 144. White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999-RGK (MANx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101374, 
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2006). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. (explaining that expenses not covered include travel costs, insurance, laundry, 
incidental costs, etc.). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Verdict and Settlement Summary, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999 RGK (MANx), 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1013741 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2006) (No. CV 06-0999 RGK), 2008 WL 
612046 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2008). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E. 2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009). 
 151. Id. at 207-08. 
 152. Id. at 207. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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student-athlete ‘by professional and commercial enterprises.’ ” 155  The 
court was also not convinced that the rules rationally promoted 
amateurism.156  The court ruled in favor of Oliver, but ultimately vacated 
the judgment in exchange for a settlement of $750,000.157 
3. Name, Image, and Likeness 
In order to protect the sanctity of Amateurism, the NCAA requires 
every Division I student-athlete to authorize use of their “name or picture 
. . . to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, 
activities or programs.”158  Not only are student-athletes required to 
authorize the NCAA to use their name or picture at no cost, but they have 
been prohibited from profiting in any way from their own name, image, 
or likeness.159  A recent court case brought this rule to the attention of 
the media and public. 
Ed O’Bannon, a former All-American basketball player at UCLA, 
played professional basketball for several years before settling down and 
eventually working for a car dealership in Nevada.160  In 2008, a friend’s 
son told O’Bannon that he was a character in a college basketball video 
game.161  The boy turned on the video game and showed O’Bannon the 
virtual version of himself.162  This player wore a UCLA jersey with the 
same number O’Bannon wore at UCLA163 and displayed O’Bannon’s 
physical characteristics.164  O’Bannon was shocked; he had never given 
permission for the use of his likeness in a video game and he had not 
been compensated for it.165 
In 2009, O’Bannon sued the NCAA, the Collegiate Licensing 
Company (CLC),166 and multiple member schools for commercial use.167  
 
 155. Id. at 214. 
 156. Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E. 2d 203, 214-15 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009). 
 157. Id. at 218-19; Aaron Sorenson, Oliver vs NCAA Settled, NCSA, 
https://www.ncsasports.org/blog/2009/10/12/3456/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2021). 
 158. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.5.1.1.1 (Promotions Involving NCAA 
Championships, Events, Activities, or Programs). 
 159. Id. § 12.1.2 (prohibiting athletes from accepting payments “in any form”). 
 160. Associated Press, Ex-UCLA star Ed O’Bannon selling cars, taking on NCAA over 
pay, INDY STAR (Feb. 19, 2014, 1:27 PM), 
https://www.indystar.com/story/sports/2014/02/19/ex-ucla-star-ed-obannon-selling-cars-
taking-on-ncaa-over-pay/5609947/. 
 161. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that video game 
was produced by software company Electronic Arts (EA)). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. (explaining that O’Bannon wore number 31 jersey while on UCLA basketball 
team). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. (CLC licenses trademarks of NCAA). 
 167. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055. 
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O’Bannon alleged that the defendants violated the Sherman Act by 
preventing student-athletes from being compensated for the use of their 
name, image, and likeness.168  O’Bannon argued that the NCAA had 
been successful at carrying out this exploitation because student-athletes 
were required to sign agreements that relinquished all rights in perpetuity 
to the commercial use of their name, image, and likeness.169  The district 
court ruled in favor of O’Bannon170 and the decision was appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit. 
The Ninth Circuit applied the rule of reason standard and agreed 
with the district court’s recognition of the relevant cognizable market, a 
“college education market” where colleges compete for athletic services 
by offering recruits scholarships, amenities, facilities, and coaching 
staff.171  They further agreed with the finding that the NCAA’s 
compensation rules function to “extinguish” a form of competition 
among schools seeking elite recruits.172  However, restricting trade is 
only unreasonable under the rule of reason standard when there are no 
legitimate procompetitive justifications or substantially less restrictive 
means to achieve the goal.173 
The NCAA’s procompetitive justifications for the compensation 
rules were “(1) promoting amateurism, (2) promoting competitive 
balance among NCAA schools, (3) integrating student-athletes with 
their schools’ academic community, and (4) increasing output in the 
college education market.”174  The Ninth Circuit recognized promoting 
amateurism as a legitimate procompetitive purpose for the NCAA to 
pursue.175  The Ninth Circuit did not find substantially less restrictive 
means to promote amateurism than the rule prohibiting compensation 
for name, image, and likeness.176  The court ultimately held that the 
NCAA must allow colleges to pay for the full cost of attendance,177 but 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
 170. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056 (recounting the district court’s conclusion that 
prohibiting student-athletes from receiving compensation for their name, image, and likeness 
violates the Sherman Act). 
 171. Id. at 1070. 
 172. Id. at 1071. 
 173. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88, 90 (1984). 
 174. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1074. 
 177. Id. at 1078-79; see also Michael McCann, Stakes and Stakeholders in Alston v. 
NCAA, the Latest College Sports Antitrust Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 4, 2018), 
https://www.si.com/college/2018/09/04/alston-v-ncaa-trial-news-updates-ncaa-cost-
attendance (“[C]ollege athletes can now accept athletic performance bonuses related to 
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that the rule of reason did not require allowing students to receive cash 
for use of their name, image, and likeness.178 
Division I football and basketball players filed several antitrust 
actions against the NCAA and multiple Division I conferences during 
the course of the O’Bannon litigation.179  These actions were 
consolidated into one action known as “The Alston Litigation.”180  The 
Alston district court concluded that the NCAA’s compensation rules 
have severe anticompetitive effects in the Division I market.181  The 
district court relied on NCAA testimony, student-athlete survey 
evidence, and demand analyses to conclude that “caps on non-cash, 
education-related benefits have no demand-preserving effect and, 
therefore, lack a procompetitive justification.”182  The district court held 
that “NCAA compensation limits preserve demand to the extent they 
prevent unlimited cash payments akin to professional salaries, but not 
insofar as they restrict certain education-related benefits.”183 
On appeal, the NCAA urged the Ninth Circuit to vacate the 
injunction because the ruling illegally encroached upon the NCAA’s role 
as the “superintendent of college sports” and was impermissibly 
vague.184  On cross-appeal, the student-athletes urged the Ninth Circuit 
to broaden the injunction because the “district court should have 
enjoined all NCAA compensation limits, including those on payments 
untethered to education.”185  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the holdings and 
injunction from the district court, finding that the “district court struck 
the right balance in crafting a remedy that both prevents anticompetitive 
harm to [s]tudent-[a]thletes while serving the procompetitive purpose of 
 
Olympic participation, obtain unlimited snacks and meals, and finance the purchase of loss-
of-value insurance through borrowing against future earnings.”). 
 178. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079; see also McCann, supra note 177 (“As a separate 
component of O’Bannon’s litigation, Electronic Arts agreed to a settlement whereby the video 
game publisher paid about $40 million to more than 29,000 current and former college 
players.”). 
 179. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. 
(Alston II), 958 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 180. Id. 
 181. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. 
(Alston I), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(“[E]lite student-athletes lack any viable alternatives to Division I, they are forced to accept, 
to the extent they want to attend college and play sports at an elite level after high school, 
whatever compensation is offered to them by Division I schools, regardless of whether any 
such compensation is an accurate reflection of the competitive value of their athletic 
services.”). 
 182. Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1257-58. 
 183. Id. at 1260. 
 184. Id. at 1263. 
 185. Id. 
 
608 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:61 
preserving the popularity of college sports.”186  On October 15, 2020, the 
NCAA petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant review of the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding.187  On December 16, 2020, the Supreme Court of the 
United States granted the NCAA’s petition for writ of certiorari.188 
D. Fair Pay to Play Legislation 
At the state level, California decided to be the first state to make a 
legislative move in the name, image, and likeness debate.189  California 
Senator, Nancy Skinner, introduced Senate Bill 206, known as the “Fair 
Pay to Play Act” in February of 2019.190  The bill allows college athletes 
in California to profit off their name, image, and likeness, sign 
endorsement deals, and seek representation without being penalized by 
their university or the NCAA.191  The bill passed unanimously through 
both the California Assembly and Senate,192 and Governor Gavin 
Newsom publicly signed the bill on September 27, 2019 on LeBron 
James’ HBO show, The Shop.193  The bill will go into effect on January 
1, 2023, giving the NCAA time to work with California and other states 
alike.194 
Advocates for the bill argue that “restricting compensation amounts 
to discrimination against college athletes—it’s near impossible to name 
another group of people who are prohibited from financially benefiting 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Remy, supra note 10. According to Donald Remy, NCAA Chief Legal Officer, 
The ruling blurs the line between student-athletes and professionals, conflicts with 
prior appellate court decisions, appoints a single court to micromanage collegiate 
sports, and encourages never-ending litigation following every rule change. The 
decision extends beyond the NCAA’s ability to govern college sports throughout 
the country, affecting how other joint ventures operate. It is critical for the Supreme 
Court to address the consequential legal errors in this case so that college sports can 
be governed, not by the courts, but by those who interact with and lead students 
every day. Together with our conferences that were individually sued in this matter, 
we will continue to defend the line between professional sports and college sports. 
Id. 
 188. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 
F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 2020 WL 7366281 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2020) (No. 20-
512). 
 189. See Sean Gregory, How California’s Historic NCAA Fair Pay Law Will Change 
College Sports for the Better, TIME (Oct. 1, 2019, 8:16 AM), 
https://time.com/5689548/california-ncaa-law/. 
 190. Press Release, Senator Nancy Skinner, Gov. Newsom Signs SB 206, the ‘Fair Pay to 
Play Act,’ (Sept. 30, 2019), https://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/20190930-gov-newsom-signs-
sb-206-%E2%80%98fair-pay-play-act%E2%80%99 [hereinafter CA Senate News]. 
 191. See generally S.B. 206, 2019-2020, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), CAL. EDUC. CODE § 
67456 (effective Jan. 1, 2023). 
 192. Gregory, supra note 189. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See CA Senate News, supra note 190. 
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from their unique talents.”195  Senator Skinner used Katelyn Ohashi, 
former UCLA gymnast, as the prime example;196 a video of Ohashi’s 
gymnastics floor routine went viral and unlike her non-athlete 
classmates, she was prohibited from monetizing her sixty million 
YouTube followers.197 
Even though the NCAA and PAC-12 initially pushed back on 
California, other states followed California’s lead.198  Florida filed a bill 
that mimics SB206.199  New York passed the “New York Collegiate 
Athletic Participation Compensation Act,” which embodies the same 
goals as California’s “Fair Pay to Play Act,” but takes it one step 
further.200  The New York law stipulates that fifteen percent of the 
revenue must be distributed back to student-athletes.201  Colorado’s bill 
gives student-athletes a right to sue if the NCAA pushes back against 
name, images, and likeness rights granted by the bill.202  South Carolina 
and Pennsylvania have plans of enacting similar bills.203 
The NCAA said it has been backed into a corner because a 
patchwork of state laws will make it impossible for NCAA members to 
compete on a level playing field.204  When the NCAA realized that 
California and other states would not back down, the NCAA Board of 
Governors created a federal and state legislation working group to 
conduct an investigation and make recommendations.205  The working 
 
 195. Gregory, supra note 189. 
 196. See CA Senate News, supra note 190. 
 197. Id.; Katelyn Ohashi, Opinion, Everyone Made Money Off My N.C.A.A Career, Except 
Me, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/katelyn-
ohashi-fair-play-act.html. 
 198. Gregory, supra note 189. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Gregg Clifton, New York Senate Bill To Require Student Athletes To Share In 
University Ticket Revenue, JDSUPRA (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-york-senate-bill-to-require-student-76744/ 
(reporting that Senator Parker envisions the revenue being divided equally among all student-
athletes because he thinks that the money represents the value of the labor.). 
 202. Charlotte Carrol, Tracking NCAA Fair Play Legislation Across the Country, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/02/tracking-ncaa-fair-
play-image-likeness-laws. 
 203. Gregory, supra note 189. 
 204. See NCAA Media Center, NCAA responds to California Senate Bill 206, NCAA 
(Sept. 11, 2019, 10:08 AM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-
responds-california-senate-bill-206. 
 205. NCAA BD. OF GOVERNORS FED. & STATE LEGISLATION WORKING GRP., FINAL 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 4 (2020) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS] (“The Board created the working group to study whether the 
Association should maintain its opposition to the proposed state and federal legislation, or 
whether it should work to develop a process whereby a student-athlete could be compensated 
for use of his or her [name, image, or likeness] in a fashion that would be consistent with the 
NCAA’s core values, mission and principles.”). 
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group’s report indicated that, “[w]hile there was significant desire to 
modernize the NCAA’s rules related to student-athlete [name, image, 
and likeness], NCAA members overwhelmingly indicated that the 
Association should not make rules changes that would undermine, or 
fundamentally change, the NCAA’s overall model of amateur 
intercollegiate athletics.”206  On April 17, 2020, the working group 
released its final report and recommendations.207  The Division I council 
was set to vote on the proposed measures in January 2021.208  However, 
“[d]ue to recent judicial, political and governmental enforcement events, 
all three divisions tabled or withdrew votes on changes to how student-
athletes can use their name, image and likeness.”209  If the NCAA 
eventually adopts the measures proposed by the working group, the 
measures will: 
Allow student-athletes to use their name, image and likeness to 
promote camps and clinics, private lessons, their own products and 
services, and commercial products or services.210 
Allow student-athletes to be paid for their autographs and personal 
appearances.211 
Allow student-athletes to crowdfund for nonprofits or charitable 
organizations, catastrophic events and family hardships, as well as 
for educational expenses not covered by cost of attendance.212 
Allow student-athletes the opportunity to use professional advice 
and marketing assistance regarding name, image and likeness 
activities, as well as professional representation in contract 
negotiations related to name, image and likeness activities, with 
some restrictions.213 
Prohibit schools from being involved in the development, operation 
or promotion of a student-athlete’s business activity, unless the 
 
 206. FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 205, at 1, 6. 
 207. See generally id. 
 208. NCAA Media Center, DI Council introduces name, image and likeness concepts into 
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activity is developed as part of a student’s coursework or academic 
program.214 
Prohibit schools from arranging or securing endorsement 
opportunities for student-athletes.215 
III. THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
Even though the NCAA is finally considering modernizing the 
name, image, and likeness rules, the NCAA is not doing enough to end 
the Sherman Act debate.  There is still a lingering problem that the 
NCAA refuses to address: the inconsistent and unnecessary principle of 
amateurism.216  NCAA officials themselves have conceded that there is 
no fixed definition for amateurism.217  Mike Slive, former SEC 
Commissioner, “testified that amateurism is ‘just a concept that I don’t 
even know what it means.  I really don’t.’ ” 218  Justice Thomas, in his 
dissenting opinion in O’Bannon, referred to amateurism as a “nebulous 
concept prone to ever-changing definition.”219  Courts, including the 
Ninth Circuit, have recognized promoting amateurism as a legitimate 
procompetitive purpose for the NCAA to pursue.220  Yet how can that be 
accepted when no one really knows what amateurism is?  Allowing the 
NCAA to use the principle of amateurism as a procompetitive 
justification for anticompetitive rules is allowing the NCAA to 
commercially exploit student-athletes by taking advantage of an 
ambiguous and malleable term. 
Even though the principle of amateurism purports to prioritize 
education for student-athletes, that is not the reality.221  Practices of fraud 
and deceit run rampant at the top intercollegiate football and basketball 
schools.222  Coaches are paying players under the table and professors 
are being pressured to give certain athletes grades they do not deserve.223  
The pressure to perform as an athlete is greater than the expectation to 
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perform as a student and, to make matters worse, students are commonly 
expected to play through injuries.224 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Principle of Amateurism is Not Consistent with Reality 
Now that Courts have successfully established a relevant 
cognizable market, the college education market, it is clear that the 
Sherman Act applies to the transactions made between colleges and 
prospective student-athletes.225  Within the college education market, 
colleges compete for athletic services by offering recruits scholarships, 
amenities, facilities and coaching staff.226  Many of the NCAA’s rules 
function to extinguish a form of competition among the schools seeking 
elite recruits.227  Although some rules may be necessary to promote 
education and create a level playing field for the universities involved, 
the NCAA should not be permitted to hide behind the principle of 
amateurism for anticompetitive rules. 
1. Amateurism Does Not Keep College Sports “Pure” 
The NCAA’s argument that the principle of amateurism keeps 
college sports “pure” is contradicted by the NCAA’s commercial 
practices.228  The origin of the word amateur is the Latin word amator, 
meaning ‘lover.’229  The principle of amateurism derives from the notion 
that a sport is “pure” when people play for the love of the game, rather 
than compensation.230  As pleasant as this may sound, the NCAA’s 
dream of purity is hypocritical given the millions of dollars in revenue it 
receives each year through the free labor of student-athletes.231  In 2019, 
the NCAA reported spending more than $18.8 billion on athletics, “[o]f 
that figure, $3.6 billion went toward financial aid for student-athletes, 
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and $3.7 billion was spent on coaches compensation.”232  At first glance, 
this may sound fair because the NCAA commits a similar amount to 
coaches and students.  However, this is unfair considering there are far 
fewer coaches than student-athletes.233  Over the years, coaches’ salaries 
have multiplied, yet the student-athletes have only recently been 
afforded the right to a “full scholarship.”234  The salaries of college 
football coaches are at a record high; as of November 2020, Alabama’s 
Nick Saban’s salary is $9,300,000, Louisiana State’s Ed Orgeron’s 
salary is $8,919,500, Clemson’s Dabo Swinney’s salary is $8,319,775, 
and Michigan’s Jim Harbaugh’s salary is $8,036,179.235  If the NCAA 
were to dedicate more money to student-athlete financial aid and less to 
coaches, it would be more difficult for universities to afford these 
exorbitant coaches’ salaries. 
The notion of purity is also contradicted by the universities’ and 
NCAA’s use of student-athletes to endorse corporate brands.236  Students 
have not been allowed to benefit from their own popularity, but the 
NCAA is allowed to sell that popularity for a large profit.237  The NCAA 
and the universities sell corporate advertisement space on the jerseys and 
helmets of the student-athletes.238  A further example of the NCAA’s 
hypocrisy can be found in the summary tax form required of nonprofits; 
in 2006 the NCAA, a “non-profit organization,” spent almost $1 million 
chartering private jets.239  It is not radical to suggest that these funds 
could be spent more responsibly, such as contributing to the student-
athlete scholarship fund. 
2. Amateurism is Not Essential for College Sports to Remain 
Popular 
The NCAA’s argument that amateurism is essential for college 
sports to remain successful and popular is unfounded.240  The NCAA 
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claims that a major reason fans watch college sports is for the “amateur” 
game, and fans would lose interest if student-athletes were 
compensated.241  However, no market research has been presented to 
support this argument.242  On the contrary, the Ninth Circuit recognized 
that “the evidence presented at trial suggests that consumer demand for 
[Football Bowl Subdivision] football and Division I basketball-related 
products is not driven by the restrictions on student-athlete 
compensation but instead by other factors, such as school loyalty and 
geography.”243 
Just as the NCAA is arguing now, the Olympics initially 
contended that “the Olympic spirit would be lost once professionals 
were allowed to participate.”244  In the 1980s, the Olympics started 
allowing professional athletes to compete and it is still revered by 
viewers as a pure and enjoyable spectacle.245  “Olympic officials, who 
had once disdained the NCAA for offering scholarships in exchange 
for athletic performance, came to welcome millionaire athletes from 
every quarter, while the NCAA still refused to let the pro Olympian 
Michael Phelps swim for his college team at Michigan.”246  
Abolishing amateurism actually increased viewership of the Olympics 
rather than decreased it, in part, because people enjoy watching athletes 
they know.247  The Olympics’ story not only disproves the NCAA’s 
theory that amateurism and popularity have a positive correlation, but 
also provides a successful image of what the NCAA could become.248 
3. Amateurism is More Detrimental to Education than Helpful 
The NCAA’s argument that amateurism allows student-athletes to 
receive a proper education is misguided.  The NCAA’s assertion that 
“student-athletes derive long term benefits from participating fully in 
academic life at their schools” is not disputed.249  The NCAA argues that 
compensation rules encourage this integration for student-athletes.250  
However, the Ninth Circuit was not convinced by this argument, finding 
that “these benefits are achieved by other NCAA rules—such as those 
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requiring student-athletes to attend class, prohibiting athletes-only 
dorms, and forbidding student-athletes to practice more than a certain 
number of hours per week.”251  In reality, student-athletes in financial 
need are often unable to fully integrate because scholarships do not 
provide them with enough funds and rigorous practice schedules do not 
leave time for a job.252  Green’s story is a prime example of this; he sold 
the jersey in order to afford a spring break trip with friends.253  The 
NCAA severely punished him for this act, all the while exploiting his 
talents by selling their own version of his jersey in the university store.254 
The NCAA emphasizes that intercollegiate athletes are “students” 
before “athletes.”255  Universities strive to educate the whole person and 
competitive athletics are an extracurricular activity directed at achieving 
that goal.256  This ideological perspective is not the reality for many 
college athletes or for the universities.257  First, if education were the 
most important objective, the salaries of professors would be 
comparable to coaches; however, this is not the case.  “[T]he average 
compensation for head football coaches at public universities, now 
more than $2 million, has grown 750 percent (adjusted for inflation) 
since the [Bd. of Regents] decision in 1984; that’s more than 20 times 
the cumulative 32 percent raise for college professors.”258  Second, 
although it is not codified, significant pressures often demand that 
student-athletes place their sport above all else.259 
Universities with major athletic departments that rely on their 
football or basketball teams to bring in large streams of revenue are 
notorious for disregarding academic shortcomings of their student-
athletes.260  In the 1980s, Jan Kemp, an English instructor at the 
University of Georgia, was fired for refusing to inflate student-athlete 
grades in her remedial English courses.261  Just before the 1982 Sugar 
Bowl, in an effort to ensure eligibility of key players, administrators 
replaced the failing grades of nine football players with passing 
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grades.262  Kemp testified that when she refused to fix a grade, a 
supervisor at the university “bellowed, ‘who do you think is more 
important to this university, you or Dominique Wilkins?’ ” 263  Kemp 
was traumatized by the hate she received for turning in the beloved 
athletics department.264 
Jasmine Harris, a sociology professor at a Division I football 
and basketball school, conducted research on the academic 
experiences of black Division I men’s basketball and football 
players.265  She found that this group spends roughly “three times as 
many hours per week on athletics as they do on academics,” 
averaging more than twenty-five hours per week on athletics and 
only eight hours per week on academics.266  Harris disagrees with the 
NCAA’s view that Division I student-athletes are students before 
athletes, she believes, “[r]ecent academic scandals—from fraudulent 
classes to inappropriate tutor support and administrative cover-ups—
reveal that a sports-first mentality permeates college campuses.”267  
Dexter Manley, a former college football player, is living proof that 
education is not a priority for many Division I athletics programs.268  
Later in his life, while playing in the NFL, he admitted that he never 
learned how to read while in college.269 
The no draft and no agent rules, justified by the principle of 
amateurism, are also examples of how the NCAA is anticompetitive at 
the cost of student-athlete education.270  If the NCAA truly wanted 
student-athletes to receive a proper education, it would welcome back 
student-athletes who were not selected during a professional draft or who 
negotiated with a professional team but ultimately decided to stay in 
college.  The two baseball players, Paxton and Oliver, who were 
punished by the NCAA for attempting to make an educated choice 
between joining a professional baseball team and remaining in 
college,271 are living proof that the NCAA would rather scare student-
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athletes out of considering other options than encouraging them to stay 
and finish their education.  The NCAA uses these fear tactics because it 
does not want to lose profitable athletes to professional sports teams, 
which is exactly the anticompetitive behavior the Sherman Act should 
prevent.  The NCAA’s no draft and no agent bylaws are anticompetitive 
because the university would be more attractive to an athlete if it allowed 
students to return to the collegiate team after participating in a 
professional draft or working with an agent.272  Further, if the student 
were allowed to return to their scholarship, that student would be more 
likely to finish his or her education. 
B. It Would be Difficult to Classify Student-Athletes as Employees 
Some critics of the principle of amateurism argue that student-
athletes should be compensated by the university as employees;273 
however, this is not a simple solution.  The workers’ compensation 
cases involving Dennison and Waldrep274 trigger emotional 
responses and make the NCAA appear evil, but the NCAA has a 
practical reason for avoiding recognizing student-athletes as 
employees.  An employee is “[s]omeone who works in the service of 
another person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of 
hire.”275  If the NCAA was not tactful with its definition of “student-
athlete,” the time commitment, coach-to-athlete dynamic, and the 
expectations of college athletes could have been evidence of an implied 
contract of hire.  There are several reasons why the NCAA would wish 
to avoid an express or implied contract of hire with student-athletes. 
First, workers’ compensation laws hold employers strictly liable 
for their employees’ injuries that occur in the scope of employment.276  
Sports-related injuries are inevitable,277 and there are nearly 500,000 
NCAA student-athletes competing in twenty-four sports every 
year.278  The cost would be immense to insure workers’ compensation 
benefits to this many people.  Based on an analysis of student-athlete 
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injuries reported in NCAA championship sports, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that 1,053,370 
injuries occurred over a five-year period.279  The CDC also found 
that an estimated 176.7 million athletes were exposed to potential 
injury over that same five-year period.280 
Second, an employer is subject to vicarious liability for the torts 
of employees committed while acting in the scope of their 
employment.281  This requirement would open the NCAA up to more 
potential lawsuits and liability on behalf of their players, especially 
while they are travelling for intercollegiate competition.  Imagine a 
scenario where a football player tackled another player during a 
game, causing that player to become paralyzed.  In this situation, the 
university could be sued for vicarious liability because their player 
was acting within the scope of his employment when he injured the 
other player.  It is unpredictable how high the costs could extend 
when all of the potential damages are considered. 
These two reasons for avoiding classifying student-athletes as 
employees are troubling considering the vast amounts of revenue the 
NCAA and member universities collect each year.  It seems hard to 
believe that funds could not be reorganized and reallocated to 
appropriately insure and employ student-athletes.  However, there is 
a third reason that makes it the most difficult to classify student-
athletes as employees. 
Title IX prohibits any education program or activity that is 
receiving federal financial assistance from denying participation or 
benefits to anyone on the basis of sex.282  Title IX would require 
universities or the NCAA to give equal pay to both female and male 
student-athletes.283  This would be difficult because Division I men’s 
football and basketball programs generate the bulk of the NCAA’s 
revenue.284  The sports that are not profitable for the universities are 
funded by the revenue generated from the profitable sports.285  If a large 
portion of this money was used to pay student-athletes, less profitable 
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sports (often women’s sports) would likely be cut entirely.286  Cutting 
women’s programs while maintaining men’s programs violates Title 
IX.287  In order to get around this, universities could cut an equal number 
of less profitable men’s and women’s sports to increase the budget for 
the salaries of student-athletes in more profitable sports.  This is also 
problematic because it would help few student-athletes at the detriment 
of the majority.  If intercollegiate sports enhance collegiate life, it is in 
the NCAA’s best interest to provide more opportunities for students to 
participate in an intercollegiate sport, rather than less. 
If the NCAA abolished the principle of amateurism and left the 
employment decision to the universities, the universities could decide if 
it were feasible to reorganize funds and employ student-athletes.  In this 
case, the NCAA could create rules that require universities to keep a 
specific number of sports or prohibit universities from finding funds by 
cutting sports.  This rule might encourage universities to reduce 
spending on facilities and coaching and redirect those funds to student-
athletes. 
Lastly, it is relevant to note that employment by the university does 
not detract from a student’s educational experience.  Many students work 
for the university during their time in college, whether it be for the 
recreation center, library, alumni donation center, etc.  If intercollegiate 
athletes were considered part-time employees of the university, they 
would still be students and still be required to fulfill the NCAA’s class 
attendance requirements. 
C. Allowing Student-Athletes to Accept Compensation from Third-
Parties for the use of Name, Image, and Likeness is a Step in the Right 
Direction 
The Fair Pay to Play scheme, as California has created it, does 
not force the NCAA or universities to recognize student-athletes as 
employees and it does not require the NCAA to compensate student-
athletes out of its own budget.288 
The Fair Pay to Play laws give student-athletes the right to enter 
contracts with and be compensated by third parties.289  Many Division I 
football and basketball players who come from urban, low-income 
families feel pressure to quit college in order to financially support their 
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families.290  Through third-party compensation, players from lower 
income communities could have an opportunity to receive income for 
incidentals as well as the possibility of providing monetarily for their 
family members.291 
With the opportunity to receive third-party compensation, student-
athletes will have more incentive to finish their education.292  For 
example, in the 2017 National Basketball Association (NBA) draft, there 
were twenty players who had completed only one year of college.293  
Given the opportunity to sign a professional contract, student-athletes 
may rationally choose to leave their university, where there is no 
possibility of compensation and a high likelihood of injury.  However, if 
student-athletes were allowed to accept endorsement deals and the 
university had a better fund to pay medical bills, the athletes may be 
more inclined to complete their degree before going to the NBA.  If the 
NCAA wants to encourage student-athletes to be students first and take 
education seriously, this would be a step in the right direction. 
Some argue that amateur athletes will not be fiscally 
responsible,294 but this argument infantilizes collegiate athletes.  No 
one is required to attend secondary education and any non-athlete 
student at the university has a right to accept endorsement deals, 
which are becoming more prevalent in this age of social media 
influencers.  Student-athletes who have gained popularity based on 
their talent and hard work should not be treated any differently than 
a theater major who accepts acting gigs while in college or monetizes 
her YouTube channel. 
D. Professional Athletes Competing at the Intercollegiate Level 
Imagine a hypothetical situation in which a college football 
player only uses one year of his collegiate football eligibility before 
he is drafted by a professional NFL team.  After several years, the 
football player wants to retire from the NFL, but he is not ready to 
give up competitive football.  At age twenty-nine, he wants to finish 
his education and play for a Division I college football team again.  
The NCAA’s amateurism rules would prohibit him from playing 
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college football because he has already played on a professional 
football team.295  At first look, this seems reasonable; however, it 
may not seem reasonable after considering a second scenario.  
Imagine a second scenario in which a Division I college football 
player enters the Major League Baseball (MLB) draft and signs a 
professional baseball contract with the Oakland A’s for roughly a 
$4.7 million bonus.  This student-athlete would now be considered a 
professional athlete,296 but the NCAA’s rules still allow him to 
continue playing for the Division I college football team until his 
baseball team requires him to leave.297  He also has the option to 
come back to college football if he decides to leave his MLB career 
down the road because the NCAA manual explicitly states, “[a] 
professional athlete in one sport may represent a member institution 
in a different sport and may receive institutional financial assistance 
in the second sport.”298  The second scenario is based on Kyler 
Murray’s story.299  “In baseball, Murray became a professional the 
second he signed with the [Oakland Athletics’].  Having taken his 
signing bonus, his college baseball career [was] over.  But no NCAA 
rule prevent[ed] him from playing football.”300  Zach Von Rosenberg 
was also able to take advantage of this NCAA rule.301  After Von 
Rosenberg committed to LSU’s baseball team, he was drafted to the 
MLB.302  When his baseball career was over, he returned to LSU, but 
this time, as a twenty-nine-year-old freshman football player.303  
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Murray and Von Rosenberg are not the only professional athletes 
who have played on NCAA teams.304 
When considering the first hypothetical, one might find it unfair 
for a twenty-nine-year-old professional athlete to compete with and 
against eighteen-year-old college freshman athletes.  However, the 
NCAA rules already allow professional athletes, such as Murray and 
Von Rosenberg, to do just that.305  The fact that professional athletes 
are already allowed to compete begs the question of how much would 
really change if the first hypothetical described were permissible. 
V. PROPOSAL 
A. The United States Supreme Court Should Definitively Hold that the 
Principle of Amateurism is Not a Legitimate Procompetitive Purpose 
for the NCAA to Pursue 
In the Spring of 2021, the United States Supreme Court will 
decide306 “whether the Ninth Circuit erroneously held, in conflict with 
decisions of other circuits and general antitrust principles, that the 
[NCAA’s] eligibility rules regarding compensation of student-athletes 
violate federal antitrust law.”307  The NCAA contends that the “NCAA 
eligibility rules designed to ensure that student-athletes are not paid to 
play their sport should be upheld against antitrust challenge without trial 
and detailed analysis.”308 
It is appropriate for the Supreme Court to apply a rule of reason 
analysis, as it did in Bd. of Regents because the NCAA’s compensation 
rules have severe anticompetitive effects in the Division I market.309  The 
Supreme Court should affirm the lower court’s finding that “caps on 
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non-cash, education-related benefits have no demand-preserving effect 
and, therefore, lack a procompetitive justification.”310 
While Courts have allowed the NCAA to get away with using the 
principle of amateurism as a legitimate procompetitive purpose for 
anticompetitive restraints, the NCAA’s justifications for upholding the 
principle of amateurism can be refuted.311  Further, the NCAA’s 
definition of amateurism has been inconsistent because the NCAA has 
been forced to change the rules to address certain realities.312  For 
example, student-athletes generally cannot receive any compensation 
outside of their scholarship, but the NCAA allows tennis players to 
accept up to $10,000 in prize money before college.313 
Even though the NCAA will likely modernize the name, image, and 
likeness rules after the council’s vote in January, the NCAA will not 
voluntarily let go of the principle of amateurism.314  The ever-changing 
principle of amateurism has caused confusion and divide in the lower 
courts.315  In order to avoid inconsistent rulings and to force the NCAA 
to change, the Supreme Court of the United States should definitively 
hold that the principle of amateurism is not a legitimate procompetitive 
purpose for the NCAA to pursue. 
In 1984, the Supreme Court stated, “[i]n order to preserve the 
character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be 
required to attend class, and the like.”316  As this Note points out, the 
principle of amateurism has evolved since 1984 and it no longer 
accomplishes the NCAA’s original goals.  The Supreme Court for Alston 
should not feel bound by the dicta of the 1984 Supreme Court because 
the principle of amateurism is no longer necessary to preserve the 
character and quality of the product. 
B. The NCAA Should Stop Adhering to the Principle of Amateurism 
and Create a Line of Demarcation Between College and Professional 
Athletics by Redefining the Term “Student-Athlete” 
Currently, NCAA Rule 12.01.1 states, “[o]nly an amateur 
student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in 
a particular sport.”317  The NCAA should remove the word amateur 
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from this rule and all rules requiring an adherence to the principle of 
amateurism.  Removing the amateurism requirement does not mean 
that the NCAA will be unable to establish a clear line of demarcation 
between college athletics and professional athletics.  The NCAA can 
establish this distinction by redefining the term “student-athlete” to 
ensure that the education of student-athletes is taken seriously.  
Rather than focus on compensation as the difference between a 
student-athlete and a professional athlete, the difference should be 
that, unlike the professional athlete, the student-athlete is not only 
dedicated to athletic competition, but is simultaneously focused on 
receiving a university education. 
The NCAA should not care whether someone has previously 
received compensation as a result of athletic skill, whether someone 
has entered a draft, or whether someone used an agent to negotiate 
with professional teams.  The NCAA should only worry about 
whether or not the current student-athlete is following the education 
and practice related requirements.  These changes would redirect the 
NCAA’s rules to a more student-focused approach, rather than an 
exploitative approach. 
C. The Universities Should Improve the Curriculum Options Offered to 
Student-Athletes 
First, universities should be allowed and encouraged to offer all 
intercollegiate athletes the option to finish their degree with a 
scholarship, even after maintaining a professional athletic career. 
Next, the NCAA should work with universities to implement a 
curriculum change.  Some people use an intercollegiate sport as a way 
to pay for an education, but other people play a Division I intercollegiate 
sport as an eligibility requirement for a professional team.  For example, 
a football player cannot enter the NFL draft until he has used up his 
college eligibility.318  Similarly, “[t]he NBA’s current rules require U.S. 
players to be 19 and one year removed from high school, which has led 
many elite high school players to use college basketball as a one-year 
waypoint before turning pro.”319  Universities should create and offer a 
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relevant major for these sport-focused students.  If someone wants to 
become an artist, he or she has the right to major in art or attend a 
secondary institution dedicated to art. 
Similarly, music and theatre are standard majors at most 
universities.  If someone hopes to make it on Broadway, he or she may 
major in theater and try out for professional roles on the side.  An interest 
in athletics is no different from an interest in art, music, or theater.  One 
could argue that it would be wasteful to offer a major dedicated to 
athletics because “the likelihood of a . . . college athlete becoming a 
professional athlete is very low,”320 but the chances of becoming a 
profitable artist, musician, or actor/actress are also extremely slim, yet 
students with these goals have the freedom to choose a major.  
Individuals have the right to choose a life path, some people choose to 
give themselves more options and other people put all of their eggs in 
one basket.  Student-athletes are not less capable of making thoughtful 
life decisions than other students. 
The athletics major would still require completion of general 
education requirements, but would also include classes on coaching, 
basic money management and investment, understanding taxes, 
knowing one’s rights, etc.  If a student has no educational interests, he 
or she might as well be required to take classes that will benefit his or 
her life.  Rather than continue with the current system, where a large 
portion of the football team is told to take Swahili321 or where academic 
counselors push athletes into fraudulent, no-show classes to keep them 
eligible to play their sport,322 universities should embrace a new concept 
of the student-athlete. 
The new curriculum would create a special system for student-
athletes, no matter what major they decide, where they are not required 
to take courses during season (nor prohibited from) and they work with 
an academic counselor to plan the bulk of their courses during other 
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portions of the year.  Student-athletes would be given unique unit 
requirements that allow them to maintain “full-time” student status, even 
if enrolled in part-time or no units during season.  Some of their practice 
time could constitute units that fulfill general education requirements, 
such as team building, leadership, experiential learning, etc.  Further, 
student-athletes would be offered a standard five-year plan (if 
interested), giving them enough time to perform academically, while 
staying committed to their sport.  The five-year plan would not expand 
their sport eligibility, but would give them an extra year to finish their 
courses. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The NCAA seems adamant about preserving the principle of 
amateurism, but its methods of keeping the tradition alive have proven 
inconsistent and exploitative.  This Note proposes a three-part, student-
centered solution to reform the current state of affairs.  First, the 
Supreme Court should definitively hold that the principle of amateurism 
is not a legitimate procompetitive purpose for the NCAA to pursue.  
Second, the NCAA should stop adhering to the principle of 
amateurism.  Removing the principle of amateurism from the NCAA 
rules does not mean that the NCAA will be unable to establish a clear 
line of demarcation between college athletics and professional 
athletics.  The NCAA can establish this distinction by redefining the 
term “student-athlete” to ensure that the education of student-
athletes is taken seriously.  The difference between an NCAA 
student-athlete and a professional athlete, is that the student-athlete 
is not only dedicated to athletic competition, but is simultaneously 
focused on receiving a university education.  Last, the NCAA should 
work with the universities to improve the curriculum options offered 
to student-athletes. 
